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Superimposing Title VII's Adverse Action 
Requirement on First enr ent Retaliation 
Claims: A Chilling Prospect for 
Government Employee Speech 
Rosalie Berger Levinson· 
Frequently, we see headlines with "disclosl.Jies,, being made by government employees 
who have become disappointed and disillusioned by the operation of government The question 
of whether govemment employees with this insid~ critical knowledge should have the n'ght to 
come forward has been the subject of nwnerous Supreme CoUJt and lower court decisio~ as 
well as scholarly debate. Employees who cniicize their supervisoiS or challenge the efficacy of 
departmental policies inevitably trigger the animosity of their superiors and thus face the 
likelihood of being subjected to transfe~ negative evaluatio~ ha.rassmen~ or possibly 
termination. On the other hancl for govemment to conduct its business in an orderly ~~ it 
must have employees who demonstrate loyalty, who seek to work within the system, and who 
strive to avoid intemal conflicts and rebellions that may hamper the ability of govemment to 
deliver services to its citizens. A basic tension exists between the government's nght to operate 
effectively and efficiently and the nght of nearly twenty-one million fedeml, stat~ and local 
government employees to disclose what they perceive is government wrongdoing, graff, 
corruption, or simply ineptitude. Recognizing this tension, the Supreme Comt in Pickering v. 
Board of Education held that comts must in each case "arrive at a balance" between these 
competing interests. 
The history of protecting the speech of govemment employees has been one of 
expansion and subsequent contraction of rights. Although, since 1983, the Supreme Court has 
made it more difficult for employees to win retaliation cases, in geneml the Pickering test has 
survived However, many appellate courts have been busy devising new tools for restricting the 
speech rights of government employees. Appellate court decisions, primarily fivm the Second, 
Fifl4 Eighth, and Eleventh Cilvuits~ have honvwed restrictive Title VII law and required that 
government employees, who seek to recover for retaliatory misconduct; demonstrate a 
significant alteration of the "conditions of employment', or a ~maten'al change in the tenns and 
conditions of employment, in order to establish a prima facie case of a First Amendment 
violation. Thus, whistle-blowing employees who ~wereJy, suffer involuntary transfers, 
suspensions with pay, pubh'c or internal reprimands~ or other fo1ms of retaliation not linked to 
te1ms of employment have been barred fivm pursuing their constitutional claims, even though 
such fo1ms of retaliatory action might inhibit and deter them fivm engaging in protected speech. 
Fwther, such decisions send a dangerous message to govemment employers that they may 
penalize those who exercise their First Amendment n'ghts provided their retaliatory conduct falls 
short of a 'maten'al change" in the te1ms or conditions of employment 
This Article traces the development of Supreme Cowt doctrine regarding the question of 
when retaliatoJY action should be viewed as an iniiingement of the fiee speech n'ghts of 
govemment employees. For almost forty years, the Supreme Comt has roled that whenever 
retaliatory conduct chills the reasonable employee fivm engaging in speech, the threshold of 
constitutional injury has been met This sta.ndarlt which protects govemment employees fivm 
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any retaliatory action that chills speech, should be preserved, leaving the ~'severity ofthe harm" 
inquiry to qssess damag(ls, not the question of liability. 
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Govemment employees are often in the bestposition to know what ails 
the agencies for which they wor~· public debate may gain much /Tom 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Assume you represent a group of govertnnent employees who 
have uncovered what they believe is critical information revealing 
dishonesty, illegality, or simply gross inefficiency and negligence 
within their department. They wish to go public with their concerns, 
but they fear retaliatory action by their supervisors. Frequently, we see 
headlines with ''disclosures" being made by govermnent employees 
who have become disappointed and disillusioned by the operation of 
govermnent. The question of whether government employees with this 
inside, critical lmowledge should be protected when they come 
forward has been the subject of numerous United States Supreme 
Court and lower court decisions, as well as scholarly debate.2 
L Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994); accordPickering v. Bd. ofEduc.!l 
391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, .518 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1996); 
see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2004) (''[T]he public's best protection 
against [unscrupulous public employees] is the insider who is willing to speak up and shed 
light on her colleagues' improprieties.''); Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 361·62 (5th Cir~ 
2004) (noting that ~'two experienced law enforcement trainers with expertise in weapons and 
the use of force, are ideally placed to offer valuable public comment about excessive force 
and the adequacy of police training and supervision," and thus these individuals have "a 
particularly weighty First Amendment interest on their side of the Pickering scales''); Dangler 
v. N.Y .. City Off Track Betting Corp .. , 193 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that 
employee whistle-blowing regarding unlawful employer conduct should be given greater 
protection than other forms of speech). 
2. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of 
an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 25·51 (1990) (arguing 
that the Court's jurisprudence is too restrictive on public employees' freedom of speech and 
limits their right to whistle-blow, because it provides judges with too much discretion on 
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Employees who criticize their supervisors or challenge the efficacy of 
departrnental policies inevitably trigger the animosity of their superiors 
and thus face the likelihood of being subjected to transfers, negative 
evaluations, harassment, or possibly termination.3 On the other hand, 
determining what type of speech is a matter of public concern); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Pennissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the 
Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 539-67 (1998) (arguing that the Court's 
current jurisprudence pennitting public employees to whistle-blow only if the speech 
concerns a matter of public concern is inconsistent with other First Amendment jurisprudence 
and is unduly burdensome on public employees); D. Gordon Smith, Beyond uPublic 
Concem':· New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 249, 268-76 
(1990) (advocating that the Court should replace its current fact-based inquiry on whether a 
public employee's whistle-blowing conduct was a matter of public concern and therefore 
protectable, by instead conducting an objective analysis on whether the whistle-blowing 
conduct caused a "disruption of public efficiency"); Michael L. Wells, Section 1983~ the First 
Amendmen~ and Public Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and VIce 
veiSa), 35 GA. L. REv. 939, 986-1005 (2001) (arguing that public employees who wish to 
whistle-blow are hindered by the Court's vague, inconsistent First Amendment jurisprudence, 
and advocating that they would be better served if the Court enacted a set of general rules 
applicable to all circumstances, rather than making a fact-based inquiry in each case as is the 
current law). 
3. Although retaliation may occur as a result of employee speech on a variety of 
topics, the need to protect government employees who disclose wrongdoing, so-called 
whistle-blowers, is well accepted. Congress adopted the federal Whistleblower Protection Act 
(WPA) to provide protection for federal employees, and many states have followed suit. Pub. 
L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (2000)). For a 
survey of state laws, see MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES, 260-73 ( 1992). 
See also EHetta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State 
Whisdeblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 105-30 (2000) (giving an overview of state 
whistle-blowing laws). I have previously argued that whistle-blowing should be viewed as a 
distinct category of employee speech deserving of enhanced protection. Rosalie Berger 
Levinson, SJ1encing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of "Efficiency': 23 
OHio N.U. L. REv. 17, 18-20 (1996). This is based on Supreme Court decisions that 
recognize that the ability to criticize government and government officials is "the central 
meaning of the First Amendment.'' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 
(1964). 
Several of the cases discussed in this Article involve government employees who allege 
they were retaliated against for disagreeing with their supervisors regarding the operation of 
government offices, yet who are barred from bringing their First Amendment claims. See 
Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 124 S. Ct. 82 (2003) (mem.) (describing a case in 
which etnployees claimed they were retaliated against for participating in a state lawsuit 
alleging that the School Board's decision to eliminate medical benefits for certain janitorial 
employees and to reduce their working hours had a disparate impact on female employees in 
violation of Louisiana state law, because all employees affected were female); Breaux v. City 
of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 155-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing a case in which the plaintiff 
alleged he was retaliated against for blowing the whistle on politically motivated 
investigations of city council members by the city's top employees; further, the jury was 
required by the court's charge to fmd that these allegations were true). 
On the other hand, it may be argued that an employee who speaks out regarding issues 
unrelated to his employment is entitled to even greater protection, because then the 
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for govertnnent to conduct its business in an orderly way, it must have 
employees who demonstrate loyalty, who seek to work within the 
system, and who strive to avoid internal conflicts and rebellions that 
may hamper the ability of government to deliver services to its 
citizens. A basic tension exists between the governn1ent's right to 
operate effectively and efficiently and the right of nearly twenty-one 
million federal, state, and local government employees to disclose 
what they perceive is government wrongdoing, graft, corruption, or 
simply ineptitude.4 Recognizing this tension, the Supreme Court in 
Pickering Y- Board of Education held that courts must in each case 
"arrive at a balance" between these competing interests .. 5 
The history of protecting the speech of government employees 
has been one of expansion and subsequent contraction of rights.6 
Although, since 1983, the Supreme Court has made it more difficult 
for employees to win retaliation cases, in general, the Pickering test 
has survived. 7 However, many appellate courts have been busy 
devising new tools for restricting the speech rights of govennnent 
employees.8 Some have done this by borrowing the Supreme Court's 
government's purported interest in the effective functioning of the office is at its lowest ebb. 
See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477-80 (1995) (striking 
down a federal law that prohibited federal workers from accepting money for speeches and 
writings and reasoning that the law was invalid to the extent the content of the speech was 
largely unrelated to the employment, whereas government employees could be restrained 
from receiving remuneration for job-related speech). Some lower courts have similarly ruled 
that when the employee's speech is about the management of the office, the speech is then 
characterized as a personal grievance, rather than a matter of public concern. See, e.g., 
Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that a school 
psychologist's criticism regarding school management was not of public concern); Holland v. 
Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a county administrator could be 
fired for his speech in disciplining subordinates because "[ s ]uch internal personnel matters 
are not likely to arouse the public's interest and do not become matters of public concern 
merely because they occur in a public agency"); Huang v. Bd. of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 
1140 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is settled that a public employee's expression of grievances 
concerning his own employment is not a matter of public concern."). The difficulty is in 
separating speech that is totally self-interested from whistle-blowing, which should trigger the 
greatest protection. 
4. The twenty-one-million figure is derived from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 312 (2003). 
5. Pickering ·v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 56& (1968). In Pickenngand its progeny, 
the Court has recognized that "Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of 
public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large." 
Nat'/ Treaswy Employees Umon, 513 U.S. at 465. 
6. See discussion infia notes 19-32 and accompanying text. 
7. See in/fa notes 33-34 and accompanying text; see also MARCY S. EDWARDS, JILL 
LEKA, JAMES BAIRD & STEFANI£ LEE BLACK, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PuBLIC WORKPLACE 
29 (1998) (noting that the Pickering balancing approach remains the current standard). 
8. See, e.g., cases cited in ITa notes 1 0, 13. 
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holding that policymaking officials do not enjoy First Amendment 
protection from patronage dismissals and applying it to deny free 
speech rights of high-level government officials.9 They have ignored 
the balancing analysis of Pickering and insulated employers from 
liability in cases where policymakers are dismissed for engaging in 
protected speech. 10 
9. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1976) (holding that the First 
Amendment right to freedom of association forbids government officials from discharging 
public employees for engaging in partisan political activities). However, the Court also 
recognized that political affiliation may be a pennissible criterion for certain polic · g 
positions where the government employer can establish that the employee occupies a position 
for which party affiliation, loyalty, or confidence is necessary. Id at 366-67; see also Rutan v. 
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990) (holding that "promotions, transfers, and recalls" 
based on political affiliation are impennissible infringements of First Amendment rights); 
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (barring a state from firing an employee based 
on political beliefs unless it can show that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement 
for job performance). Decisions from several circuits have applied Elrod when a 
policymaking employee is terminated for at least certain types of speech. 
10. See, e.g., Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 922-25 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
po1ice commissioner, who was tenninated based on a memo criticizing the current deputy 
and seeking to eliminate that position, was not protected; applying the Elrod-Branti approach, 
rather than Pickering balance, and determining that the government should be permitted to 
dismiss any policymaking or confidential employee who voices opinions on political or 
policy-related issues); Garcia v. Kankakee County Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 533-35 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that the interim director of the housing authority may be discharged for 
writing memos complaining about the chainnan 's conduct because of his policymaking 
status; relying on Elrod and Bra.ntJ; the court reasoned that First Amendment does not protect 
abstract statements of top employees who are responsible for setting objectives and 
implementing political decisions, even though the plaintiff presented the case as a Connick-
Pickeringfree speech case, rather than a political association case); Vargas-Hamson v. Racine 
Unified Sch. Dist., 272 F. 3d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that Ekod applies when 
policymaking employees engage in speech relating to their political or substantive policy 
viewpoints: "[T]he First Amendment does not prohibit the discharge of a policy-making 
employee when that individual has engaged in speech on a matter of public concern in a 
manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies."); Fazio v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an assistant district attorney 
discharged after filing papers to run against the district attorney is unprotected under the 
Elrod-Bmnti line of cases because he is a policymaker). But see Curinga v. City of Clairton, 
357 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that "Pickenngbalancing should be used when 
termination is motivated by both a public employee's speech and political affiliation," but that 
in cases involving policymakers, the government's interests are more likely to outweigh those 
of the employee); Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1139 (lOth Cir. 2000) (holding 
that where the speech does not implicate the employee's politics or substantive policy 
viewpoints, the policymaking exception does not apply and the court should instead apply the 
Pickering balancing test); Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 976-83 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that because political reasons did not cause the county to withdraw its offer to a city 
employee who criticized city programs, the Pickering balancing test applies rather than the 
policymaking exception developed in Elrod; however, the employee's policymaking status 
remains a critical factor in the Pickering balance, and here the county's interest in goverrunent 
efficiency and workplace harmony justified its decision to rescind the offer to the plaintiff 
because his speech undermined his credibility with several supervisors and there was a 
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Other appellate court decisions, primarily from the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
have employed an even more inexplicable mechanism for constraining 
and inhibiting speech.11 They have borrowed restrictive Title VII law 
and required that government employees who seek to recover for 
retaliatory misconduct demonstrate a significant alteration of the 
"conditions of employment'' or a ''material change in the tertns and 
conditions of employment" in order to establish a prima facie case of a 
First Amendment violation. 12 Thus, whistle-blowing employees who 
"merely'' suffer involuntary transfers, suspensions with pay, public or 
internal reprimands, or other fortns of retaliation not linked to terms of 
employment have been barred from pursuing their constitutional 
claims, even though such forms of retaliatory action might inhibit and 
deter them from engaging in protected speech.13 Further, such 
reasonable belief that his employment would have created workplace dissention); Lewis v. 
Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162-65 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the policymaker exception does not 
apply to free speech cases, although one's status as a policymaker may tilt the Pickering 
balance toward the government); Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(holding that policymakers who express their disagreements with their superior on a number 
of policy and persotmel issues may be discharged under the Pickering balance when the 
supervisor no longer has the necessary trust and confidence in them). 
11. See discussion infia note 13. 
12. The quoted terntinology stems from the text of Title VII, as well as cases 
interpreting that language. See intra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. 
13. See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 619 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a 
public employee's First Amendment claim based on the court's ruling that, in order to prove 
retaliation by a public employer, "the complained-of action must involve an important 
condition of employment;' such as discharge, demotion, refusal to hire or promote, or 
reprimand; although agents of the Board of Regents rated the plaintiff negatively and voted to 
tenninate her, other agents later overrode the votes, thus allowing the plaintiff to keep her 
position with the same pay and benefits, and the court reasoned that any emotional distress or 
costs she incurred incidental to seeking review were too insubstantial to be an adverse 
employment action); Meyers v. Neb. Health & Hwnan Servs., 324 E3d 655, 659-60 (8th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the employment action must be a "material change in the terms or 
conditions of ... employment" to be actionable and "[l]oss of status and prestige alone do not 
rise to the level of an adverse employment action"; however, the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment when fact questions remained as to whether reassignment 
caused changes in the intangible employment conditions that were "significant or material"); 
Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 712-15 (8th Cir. 2002) (fmding that neither an involuntary 
transfer, which resulted in "no diminution in title, position, salary, job responsibilities, 
benefits, hours, or other material terms or conditions:' nor the presence of ''negative 
memoranda in (her] personnel file,'' nor an internal investigation that resulted in "no material 
disadvantage in a term or condition of employment" constitutes an adverse employment 
action; to prove a constitutional injury the employee must establish "a tangible change in 
duties or working conditions that constitute[s] a material disadvantage" (quotation omitted)); 
Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that "minor shifts in 
employment responsibility [do] not significantly alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] 
employment'' and, therefore, do not constitute an adverse employment action); Bechtel v. City 
of Belton, 250 F. 3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that "adverse employment action 
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decisions send a dangerous message to govermnent employers that 
they may penalize those who exercise their First Amendment rights 
provided their retaliatory conduct falls short of a "material change" in 
the terms or conditions of employment.14 Although treating 
policymakers the same regardless of whether free association or :free 
speech rights are at stake may be too simplistic as a matter of 
constitutional law interpretation,15 superimposing federal statutory 
must effectuate 'a material change in the tenns or conditions of ... employment''' in order to 
establish a First Amendment violation) (quoting Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 
(8th Cir. 1997)); Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d 479, 483-84 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(reversing a trial court's award of damages to the chief of police in a whistle-blowing 
situation, concluding that no reasonable jury would fmd that the transfer of the chief of police 
amounted to "some serious, objective, and tangible ha1 n1," even though the transfer meant his 
pension would be substantially reduced if he retired early); Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 
F. 3d 150, 156-64 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that retaliation consisting of ''investigations, 
criticisms, public ... reprimands, psychological and polygraph testing, suspension with pay, 
[and a] transfer ... do not, either individually or collectively, constitute adverse employment 
actions"; further, rescinded reprimands, even if the correction is unpublicized, and retaliatory 
threats, which the court considers just "hot air," are not actionable); Benningfield v. City of 
Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that an employee subjected to 
accusations, an investigation, a transfer that involved change in hours, and denial of the 
opportunity to attend a conference could not allege a First Amendment retaliation claim 
because such activities do not constitute adverse employment actions); Harrington v. Harris, 
118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[D]ecisions concerning teaching assignments, pay 
increases, administrative matters, and departmental procedures, while extremely important to 
the person who dedicated his or her life to teaching, do not rise to the level of a constitutional 
deprivation." (quotation omitted)); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.Jd 702, 705-10 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that a series of retaliatory actions, including being reprimanded for not 
being at her work station when the employee was in the Human Resources Department, 
harassment and threats by coworkers that management ignored, receipt of negative 
perfonnance appraisal that caused the employee to miss a salary increase, and the 
requirement that she perform dangerous tasks, were not actionable); see also Phillips v. 
Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]o prove a claim of First Amendment retaliation 
in a situation other than the classic examples of discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, 
detnotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand, plaintiff must show that ( 1) using an objective 
standard; (2) the total circumstances of her working environment changed to become 
unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical ... workplace."). 
14. The entrenchment of this new requirement is reflected in a recent article 
discussing the First Amendment rights of government employees, which advises that "[i]n 
order to constitute an adverse action, the employer's conduct must be materially adverse in 
nature regarding the employee's terms and conditions of employment." William A. Herbert, 
The First Amendment and Public Sector Labor Relations, 19 LAB. LAW. 325, 341 (2004). 
15. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 48-52 (arguing that policymalcing may be a factor 
in conducting the Pickenng balance, but it should not be determinative). The Supreme Court 
in Pickering noted that the relationship between the employer and the employee and the need 
for personal loyalty or confidence is a relevant concern, but it is only one of five factors 
identified by the Court in detenuining whether First Amendment rights outweigh the 
government's interest. See id at 50. For example, if a policymaker discloses serious 
government corruption or wrongdoing, her right to speak out as well as the public's right to 
hear this critical information may outweigh the government's interest in having a 
"harmonious" workplace. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 ( 1968). The 
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restrictions on First Amendment speech doctrine has no legitimate 
rationale. There have been instances in which the Supreme Court has 
' 
used the United States Constitution to interpret statutes adopted by the 
same Founding Fathers,16 but there appears to be no sound reason why 
specific statutory text adopted in the 1960s and 1970s should be used 
to restrict the breadth of the First Amendment, which became part of 
our Constitution ahnost two hundred years earlier.17 
This Article traces the development of Supreme Court doctrine 
regarding the question of when retaliatory action should be viewed as 
an infringement of the free speech rights of government employees. 
For ahnost forty years, the Court has ruled that whenever retaliatory 
conduct chills the reasonable employee from engaging in speech, the 
threshold of constitutional injury has been met.18 In Part III, the 
requirement of an adverse employment action under Title VII is 
discussed, focusing primarily on Title VII retaliation cases. In Part rv, 
I demonstrate why the Rutan standard, which protects government 
employees from any retaliatory action that chills speech, should be 
Supreme Court has rejected the notion that certain classes of speakers are simply outside the 
First Amendment, recognizing that ~'[t ]he inherent worth of the speech in tern1s of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source .... " First Nat'l 
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,777 (1978). To hold that a government employee's speech can 
be proscribed no matter bow significant the content and without balancing competing 
concerns in the workplace is to cut off public debate on speech that lies at the core of the First 
Amendment speech which is necessary to democratic self-government. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Garrison v. Louisia.na, ''speech concerning public affairs is ·more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.'' 379 U.S. 64,74-75 (1964); cf.Whitney C. 
Gibson, Rethinkil1g the Sixth Circuits Erosion of First Amendment Rights m Rose v. 
Stephens, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 767, 773 (2003) (arguing that the Elrod-Branti appro~ch is 
appropriate where the speech exemplifies a political or substantive policy disagreement 
. . . 
between the policymaker and her employer that is so significant as to destroy the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the working relationship). Because it is likely that this type of speech 
would be deemed unprotected under the Pickenng balance, I see no need to apply the 
mechanical Ekod-Bra.nti test rather than engage in the more fact-sensitive Pickering 
approach. For example, in Lewis v. Cowen, the court recognized that "a public employer's 
interests in numing an effective and efficient office are given the utmost weight where a high-
level subordinate insists on vocally and publicly criticizing the policies-of his employer.'' 165 
F. 3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the court refused to simply substitute Elrod for the 
more nuanced Pickering balance. Jd at 162-63. 
16. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass-'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 385-86 
(1982) (holding that provisions of the Reconstruction Era prohibiting race discrimination, 
more specifically 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a) (1982)~ are restricted to intentional discrimination 
because the same Congress that enacted this law also adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which has been interpreted to reach only intentional discrimination). 
1 7. See discussion infi'a Part rv. 
18. See iniTa notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Rutan v. Republican 
Party; 497 U.S. 62 (1990)). 
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preserved, leaving the "severity of the harm" inquiry to assess 
damages, not determine liability. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 
Before the 1960s, the Supreme Court freely allowed a 
govermnent employer to retaliate against employees for engaging in 
First Amendment activitieS.19 In his classic articulation of the "right-
privilege distinction," then-Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice 
Holmes in McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford stated that "[t]he 
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.''20 As late as 1952, in Adler v. 
Board of Education, the Court continued to reason that although 
government employees have the right "to assemble, speak, think and 
believe as they will ... they have no right to work for the State in the 
school system on their own terms."21 
fu 1967, the Court overruled Adler and fortnally rejected this 
doctrine, declaring that governn1ent cannot condition employment on 
relinquishing First Amendment rights:22 One year later, in Pickering ·v. 
Board of Education, the Court held that a public school teacher could 
not be dismissed for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the 
School Board's allocation of funds to educational and athletic 
programs.23 Justice Marshall observed that courts must strike a 
"balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it perfonns through its employees."24 Justice Marshall 
conceded that free speech rights of government employees do not 
enjoy the same protection as those of private citizens because the 
19. Sec Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951); United Pub. Workers 
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102-03 (1947)~ 
20. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). For a 
broader discussion of the development and eventual decline of the "right-privilege 
distinction," see generally William W Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
21. Adlerv. Bd. ofEduc., 342 U.S. 485,492 (1952). 
22. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ("[T]he theory that 
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, 
regardless of how unreasonable, has been unifonnly rejected." (quotation omitted)); see also 
' ' 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv: 1413, 1415 (1989) 
(discussing how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions protects employees' free speech 
rights). 
23. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1968). 
24. ld at 568. 
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state's interest "in regulating the speech of its employees ... differ[s] 
significantly from those it p.ossesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general."25 Nonetheless, the Justice also 
emphasized the importance of "free and open debate ... to infortr1ed 
decision-making by the electorate."26 Because school teachers were 
most likely to have informed opinions on the topic of school funding 
and budgetary matters, the Justice stated that ~'it is essential that they 
be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory 
dismissaL"27 Although the Court did not set down specific standards as 
to how the balance should be struck, Justice Marshall's opinion 
imposed the burden on government to prove the restriction on speech 
was necessary to prevent actual impainnent of the efficient operation 
of the services it perfonns as an employer.28 
Since Pickering, the Supreme Court has rendered a few decisions 
that, while generally preserving Pickering, have eviscerated the broad 
protection for speech envisioned by Justice Marshall. In Connick v. 
Myers, the Court made it more difficult for government employees to 
succeed in their retaliation claims by requiring them to first prove that 
their speech involved a matter of public concem.29 Further, Connick 
25. !d. 
26. Id at 571-72. 
27. /d. at 572. Indeed, the Court rejected the notion that the speech would be 
wtprotected if some of the teacher's statements were false or damaging to the reputation of 
the board and superintendent. Id at 570-72. The Court reasoned that absent proof that false 
statements were made knowingly and recklessly by the teacher, he could not be 
constitutionally retaliated against for this sp,eech. Jd at 574-75. 
28. See id. at 572-74. The lower courts understood the decision to require that the 
employer raise and establish the unprotected character of the employee's speech by 
demonstrating that the employee's expression "materially and substantially" interfered with 
the discharge of duties and responsibilities~ See, e.g., Conner v. Reinhard; 847 F.2d 384, 391-
92 (7th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that because "[t]he public has a legitimate interest in receiving 
infonnation concerning abuse[ s] within public institutions,'' evidence of the actual effects of 
spe,ech is necessary before a court can fmd that an employer's functions have been 
substantially impeded so as to remove protection from an employee's speech); Nat'l Gay Task 
Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (lOth Cir. 1984) (noting that the state's interests 
outweigh the employee's "interests only when the expression results in a material or 
substantial interference or disruption in the normal activities of the [workplace]''; an 
employer must prove that the "restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official 
functions or to insure [an] effective perfonnance by the employee;.,). 
29. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983). In a five-four decision, the 
Court held that the threshold question must be whether the employee speech is a matter of 
public concern. Id. The Court reasoned that to "presume that all ,matters which transpire 
within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark-
and certainly every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a 
constitutional case." ld at 149. The Court advised that this detennination -would be made by 
examining the fonn, context, and content of the speech. ld at 14 7 -48'. The decision thus 
redefined and narrowed the definition of what speech would be worthy of the ''public 
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established that a likelihood that speech may cause disruption, rather 
than evidence of actual disruption, sufficed to defeat the employee's 
speech claim.30 Subsequently, in ltaters v. Churchill, the Court made it 
concern" label. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 30-38 (criticizing this development); see also 
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL GoVERNMENT CML 
RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:10 nn.l9-40 (1991 & Supp. 2004) (collecting cases from various 
circuits regarding which types of speech will and will not be deemed to be a matter of public 
concern); Estlund, supra note 2, at 50-51 (arguing that the "matter of public concern" 
requirement is vague and subjective); Herbert, supra note 14, at 328-37 (describing the 
various types of speech that might or might not qualify as speech of public concern). 
30. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. The Court balanced Myers' First Amendment 
right to free speech against the government's interest in "the effective and efficient fulfillment 
of its responsibilities to the public." Id at 150. Concluding that most of Myers' speech, 
which consisted of a questionnaire regarding office morale that she distributed to coworkers, 
did not constitute a matter of public concern, the Court deferred to the employer's decision 
that the insubordination manifested by that questionnaire posed a threat to efficiency and 
close working relationships. ld at 151-52. Initially it appeared that the requirement of actual 
disruption might be retained when the employee's speech more clearly involved a matter of 
public concern, because the Court suggested that the stronger the employee's showing that the 
speech was of public concern, the greater the burden on government to justify its adverse 
action. Id at 152. However, a plurality opinion in Uiite.l8 v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), 
commented that actual tangible interference with the operation of government was rarely a 
factor in the Court's decisions, but rather "we have given substantial weight to government 
employers' reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter 
of public concern." ld at 673 (emphasis added). But see Levinson, supra note 3, at 41-48 
(critiquing this development). The trend in the lower courts has been to allow public 
employers to sanction employee speech based on fear of disruption, even absent evidence of 
actual disruption. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F. 3d 351, 355 (2d Cir.), cert. demed 124 S. 
Ct. 135 (2003) (mem.) (holding that discharge does not violate the First Amendment when an 
employer's prediction of disruption is reasonable and such is enough to outweigh value of 
speech); Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 372 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the relevancy of 
plaintiff's contention that his news release did not ignite actual disruption in the workplace 
because an employer need not establish actual disruption when a threat of future disruption is 
obvious); Rash-Aldridge v. Ramirez, 96 F.3d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
plaintiff was properly removed from the board based on the potential disruptive effect of her 
speech in failing to represent the interests of the city council and supporting a project 
opposed by the council of which she was a member); Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F. 3d 
886, 895-99 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that, after Mte.IS', it is no longer necessary to show actual 
disruption, although the government must make a substantial showing that the speech was in 
fact likely to be disruptive); Jeffiies v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that, 
based on U'atei.S', the government's burden is to make a substantial showing of likely 
interference and not actual disruption); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1344 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that, after Connick, demonstration of actual disruption in the workplace is 
not required; "[ r ]ather, the amount of disruption that a government employer must tolerate 
depends on ... the extent to which the speech addresses a matter of public concern" as well 
as "the type of service the employer provides ... and the context of the speech"). But see 
Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford Heights, 359 F.3d 933, 943-45 (7th Cir. 2004) (fmding 
that a town was not justified in firing an employee who typed a citizen's complaint against the 
Superintendent of Public Utilities, which was then printed and distributed, because the speech 
was of public concern and because the goverrunent, although not required to show actual 
proof of disruption, did not even show a reasonable prediction of disruption); Nunez v. Davis, 
169 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a court administrator who was fired by a 
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more difficult for govertnnent employees to establish that speech, 
assutning such is protected, was a substantial or motivating factor in 
the adverse treatment.31 The Court, in a plurality opinion authored by 
Justice O'Connor, held that the _public employer need conduct only the 
same type of reasonable investigation as a private employer would in 
determining the content of an employee's speech .. 32 
Although these de.cisions have made it more difficult for 
government employees to bring their actions, the Court has retained 
the core principle that the public employer ultimately has the burden of 
justifying its retaliatory action by proving that the employee's speech 
interfered with, or was highly likely to interfere with, govermnent 
operations.33 Many litigants have succeeded in demonstrating that their 
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, and that government 
officials who take retaliatory action may be held individually liable for 
violating clearly established First Amendment law.34 
judge because of her expressive conduct could not be dismissed absent real, not imagined, 
disruption, and here there was no noticeable difference in the working relationship); Curtis v. 
Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. Bd., 147 F.3d 1200, 1213-14 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that absent a 
showing of any actual disruption attributable to comments regarding racial equity made by 
the school's equity/aflnmative action officer, the Pickering balance weighs in favor of 
plaintiff); Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
when an employee was critical of her supervisor, the county had to show more than mere 
disruption; actual injury to legitimate interests is required because, otherwise, allegations of 
wrongdoing would be suppressed because disruption necessarily accompanies such 
exposure). 
31. Uflters, 511 U.S. 661. 
32. Id at 676-77. Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that "in order 
to avoid liability, the public employer must not only reasonably investigate the third-party 
report, but must also actually believe it." Id at 682-83 (Souter, J., concurring); see also 
Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on W8tem, the court 
accepted findings of an investigation conducted by defendants in detennining whether the 
employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern; when there is a dispute about what 
an employee actually said, courts should accept the facts as the employer reasonably found 
them to be). 
33. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995); 
lliltel3', 511 U.S. at 673-74; see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004) 
("[T]he Supreme Court has held that the goverrunent may not punish the speech of a public 
employee if it involves matters of public concern unless the state can prove that the needs of 
the government outweigh the speech rights of the employee."). 
34. Se~ e.g., Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d 503, 516 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the magistrate erred in entering judgment as a matter of law following a jury 
verdict in favor of a teacher on her First Amendment retaliation claims because the law was 
clearly established, even under the Pickering balance, that a school teacher who speaks out 
challenging the deficiency of a school program for disabled students was speaking on a 
matter of public concern, and evidence of any disruption was minor and was outweighed by 
the interest in allowing the teacher to express herself; thus, school officials were not entitled 
to qualified immunity from this claim); Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 
2004) (fmding that the defendants did not enjoy qualified inununity from a claim brought by 
2005] GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH 681 
In general, the following analysis has emerged from the Supreme 
Court cases- Initially, the court must decide whether the employee 
engaged in speech addressing a matter of public concem.35 This 
determination will be made by a full assessment of the content, form; 
and context of the speech.36 Second, the employee must prove that the 
retaliatory action was motivated by this speech.37 Third, the court must 
balance the employee's speech rights against the employer's interest in 
the efficient functioning of the office.38 Finally, the employer may still 
government employees because the right to be free of retaliation for exercising their free 
speech rights concerning alleged corruption in Puerto Rico's Department of Justice was 
clearly established); Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that the law was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes that a deputy district 
attorney could not be retaliated against for sending a memorandum to his supervisors alleging 
that a deputy sheriff included false statements in a search warrant affidavit; it was clear that 
such speech addressed a matter of public concern and that the attorney's interest in making 
this disclosure outweighed the government's interest in avoiding disruption, and thus 
defendants were on notice that the Pickenng balance favored the plaintiff); Mihos v. Swift, 
358 F.3d 91, 109-10 (1st Cir. 2004) (deciding that a reasonable official should have known 
that terminating a public official simply because he cast his vote on a matter of public 
concern contrary to the wishes of the appointing authority violated clearly established rights, 
and thus this conduct was not insulated by qualified immunity; "[n]o reasonable public 
official could have failed to realize that a member of a public instrumentality cannot be 
terminated on such grounds"); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783-85 (4th Cir~ 2004) 
(finding that, although the particularized balancing required under Pickering makes it 
difficult to meet the ~'clearly established" test, a teacher~s speech in opposition to race 
discrimination against elementary school children was so clearly protected that a reasonable 
superintendent should have known that taking retaliation in response to such speech, 
especially where it was not disruptive to the point of jeopardizing the welfare of the children,. 
was protected, and thus the superintendent was not entitled to qualified immunity for his 
action in demoting. the teacher)~ 
35. See Conmck, 461 U.S. at 146-48. 
36. See id. at 147-48. 
37. See, e.g., Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca; 329 F. 3d 422, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that absent evidence that city council members were aware of employee's speech 
before they took their discharge vote, it cannot be e.stablished that dismissal was 
"substantially motivated" by that speech); Ambrose v. Township ofRobinson, 303 F.3d 488, 
493-94 (3d Cir. 2002) (fmding that even if there is temporal proximity between the protected 
activity and the adverse action, an employee must still show that decisionmakers were aware 
of the protected conduct); Nieves v. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 690, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(deciding that the timing of events was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact when the 
employee could not show that the actual decision was made after the protected speech, and 
thus summary judgment was appropriate); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 746-47 
(lOth Cir. 1999) (holding that mere temporal proximity of the speech to the discharge is 
insufficient, without more, to establish a retaliatory motive, and thus the employee's First 
Amendment claim failed). 
38. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Although the court, 
rather than the jury, engages in the Pickering balancing, generally underlying factual disputes 
whose resolution might affect this balance should be decided by the jury. See, e.g., Brochu v. 
City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1156-61 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that although the 
Pickering balance involves a question of law for the court, there may be cases where factual 
disputes must be resolved by the jury before the court can make this detennination); Gom1an-
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prevail if it carries its burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the same action would have been taken even if the 
plaintiff had not engaged in protected speech.39 
With regard to the retaliatory conduct, there must be an 
assessment of whether the adverse action has · · ged upon First 
Amendment rights. Although defining". · gement" has proved to 
be a difficult task with regard to many fundamental rights,40 the 
Supreme Court has provided fairly clear guidance as to when 
retaliatory conduct sufficiently burdens speech so as to trigger the 
Pickering balance test. It is important to note that a finding of 
........... · gement'' does not mean that a court must find a First 
Amendment violation. It simply means that the employee has met the 
threshold necessary to proceed with the First Amendment analysis. 
As to this · · gement question, the Supreme Court in Rutan V-
Republican Party explained: "[T]he First Amendment . . . already 
protects state employees not only from patronage dismissals but also 
from 'even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday 
party for a public employee . . . when intended to punish her for 
Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 556-58 (2d Cir. 2001) (imding that factual 
disputes precluded swnmary judgment on the Pickering balancing issue; it is only after such 
disputes are resolved by a fact finder that the court can come to its own legal conclusions 
about whether the employer's inefficiency outweighs the employee's interest in free speech); 
Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 880-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that although the 
balance of the interests is a matter of law for the district court, the underlying factual 
questions should be submitted to the jury, generally through interrogatories or a special 
verdict form); Myers v. Hasara, 226 F.3d 821, 826-28 (7th Cir. 2000) (deciding that factual 
disputes relating to the factors to be considered in the Pickering balance precluded summary 
judgment). 
39. See Bd. of Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1996) (discussing these 
elements); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
(discussing the last element); see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004). 
Spiegla interpreted Mt. Healthy to impose a three-step analysis. ld First, the court must 
determine whether the employee's speech enjoys protection. Id Second, the employee must 
establish that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action. /d 
Third, the employer has the opportunity to prove it would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the employee's protected speech. Id 
40. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ I 0.1.2 (2d ed. 2002). Professor Chemerinsky notes that the Supreme Court has provided 
little guidance as to when government action that burdens the exercise of a right, rather than 
prohibiting it, should be deemed an infringement. ld As discussed in this Article, the 
Supreme Court has determined that government action that chills employee speech infringes 
on the First Amendment. See infia notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Rutan v. 
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)). Thus, lower courts are not free to impose new 
constraints that require employees to prove anything more than that the retaliatory action 
would deter the reasonable employee from engaging in protected speech. 
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exercising her free speech rights."~1 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had proposed that only politically 
based employment decisions that are "the substantial equivalent of a 
dismissal" violate the First Amendment.42 The Supreme Court found 
this standard unduly restrictive, because it failed to recognize that less 
harsh deprivations can also chill speech.43 Significantly, the Court 
rejected the employer's argument that patronage practices that did not 
have an adverse effect on terms and conditions of employment were 
not actionable.44 The Court recognized that employers could deter 
speech through other retaliatory action, even if such could not be 
characterized as a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions 
of employment.45 
This same deep concern about chilling employee speech was a 
core factor in the Supreme Court's 1995 decision invalidating portions 
of the Ethics Reform Act that barred employees from receiving 
honoraria for their speech activities.46 In Umted States v. National 
Treasmy Employees Union, the Court recognized that preventing 
41. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76 n.8 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943, 954 
n.4 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
42. Rutan, 868 F.2d at 949. 
43. See Rutan, 491 U.S. at 75. 
44. See id at 73. Prior to Rutan some courts had argued that the retaliatory harm 
must be severe, and thus insubstantial changes in an employee's work conditions, even when 
retaliatory and even where such might reasonably chill an employee's exercise of the right to 
free political association~ were not actionable. The rationale was that allowing such claims 
"would cause a level of burden that is almost certainly outweighed by the government's need 
to protect its own interest." Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st 
Cir. 1989). Rutan made it clear that the relevant question is whether the retaliatory action 
deters speech. 497 U.S. at 7 5. Others continue to argue, however, that the assessment of the 
level of harm should be done at the initial stage in order to prevent "constitutionalizing 
employee grievances." Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F. 3d 318, 329 (2d Cir. I 996) (Jacobs, J., 
concurring); see also Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd., 232 F.3d 1334, 
1339-41 (lOth Cir. 2000) {reasoning that although Rutan made clear that deprivations less 
harsh than dismissal would violate a public employee's rights, it does not mean that all acts, 
no matter how trivial, are sufficient to support a retaliation claim; allegations that plaintiff 
was subjected to a Professional Development Plan, which required her to strive to create a 
more collaborative work environment, and to attend Monday morning meetings to discuss 
complaints that had been made about her by other teachers, were "of insufficient gravity to 
premise a First Amendment violation"); Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F. 3d 97, 
10 I n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that Rutan's footnote 8 is "colorful rhetoric" but does not 
foreclose rules that allow public employers to take actions which fall short of demotions or 
transfers); Pierce v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 n.l (5th Cir. 1994) 
("We choose not to read the Supreme Court's dicta literally; rather, we apply the main 
analysis of Rutan to retaliation claims and require more than a trivial act to establish 
constitutional harm."). 
45. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 73. 
46. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 463 ( 1995). 
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compensation for speech may deter, and thus infringe on, protected 
speech rights.41 It reasoned that the Act's "large-scale disincentive to 
Government employees' expression . . . imposes a significant burden 
on the public's right to read and hear what the employees would 
otherwise have written and said.'~8 The · detertnination of whether 
retaliatory conduct is substantial enough to "chill" speech is 
concededly open-ended, but Rutan and National Treasmy demonstrate 
that the Supreme Court has broadly construed the "chilling effect" 
standard to protect government employees who are exercising their 
First Amendment rights.49 
Following Rutan's lead, many lower courts have recognized that 
employees alleging free speech violations may proceed with their 
claims provided the retaliatory conduct would deter the average 
individual from engaging in protected activity.5° For example, in 
Fanner v. Cleveland Public Power, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff need only "suffer an injury 
that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing 
to engage in that [constitutionally protected] activity" in order to state 
an actionable claim. 51 In Farmer, the court found that reduction of a 
plaintiff's job responsibilities would qualify where the change arguably 
transformed plaintiff from a policymaking, supervisor-level employee 
to someone engaged in merely perfonrung clerical tasks. 52 In Spiegla 
v. Hull, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee's transfer to a more 
physically demanding and less skilled position and an unfavorable 
change in her work schedule could form the basis of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim because such actions were sufficient to 
deter exercise of free speech.53 Finally, in Edwards v. City of 
4 7. See id. at 466-67. 
48. Id at 470. 
49. See id. at 466-70; Rutan, 491 U.S. at 73. 
50. See, e.g., Farmer v. Cleveland, 255 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2002); see also infm 
notes 120-129 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that have specifically rejected the 
Title VII analysis in favor of the "chilling effect" approach). 
51. Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation 
omitted) (alteration in original); see also Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F. 3d 
968, 977 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[t]he denial of ... a 'trivial' benefit may fonn the basis 
for a First Amendment claim where the aim is to punish protected speech"; thus a hospital 
could be held liable for subjecting a physician to an investigation that threatened revocation 
of his clinical privileges and for filing an adverse action report against him). 
52. 295 F. 3d at 602. 
53. 371 F.3d 928, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Thomsen v. Romeis, 198 F.3d 
1022, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 
(7th Cir. 2004) (implying that even three reprimands may be actionable if they create the 
potential for chilling employees' speech on matters of public concern, even when the 
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Goldsboro, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
held that the First Amendment prohibits an employer from making 
threats to discharge an employee in an effort to chill the exercise of the 
employee's First Amendment rights. 54 
Further support for the notion that any government conduct that 
chills speech should be actionable as a violation of the First 
Amendment is found in the Supreme Court's analysis in Board of 
County Commissioners v. Umbehr.55 In Umbehr, the Court held that 
the Pickering balancing test should be extended to apply to an 
independent contractor, who alleged he lost a government contract in 
retaliation for engaging in speech. 56 The Court noted that a contractual 
relation, like an employment situation, provides a valuable financial 
benefit and that the loss of this benefit "in retaliation for speech may 
chill speech on matters of public concern by those who, because of 
their dealings with the government, 'are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work."'57 Although it was 
argued in Umbehr that loss of one government contract should not be 
equated to loss of one's job, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
chill on First Amendment rights could nonetheless be real and thus 
such claims are ,actionable.58 As in Rutan, the Supreme Court focused 
on whether certain government conduct chilled speech,-not on whether 
the adverse action could be-characterized as a material or substantial 
employment action.s9 
consequences might appear somewhat speculative); Smith v~ Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 649 n.3 (7th 
Cir~ 1994) (''[E]ven minor fonns of retaliation can support a First Amendment claim, for they 
may have just as much of a chilling effect on speech as more drastic measures.'').-
54. 178 F. 3d 231 ~ 246-4 7 (4th Cir. 1999); see also B,elcher v. City of McAlester, 324 
E3d 1203, 1207~ n.4 (1Oth Cir. 2003) (recognizing that "[t]hreats of dismissal based on an 
employee's speech may constitute adverse employment action"; the cowt found that 
reprimanding a firefighter would have a chilling effect on other employees who wished to 
disclose departrnental wrongdoing); Bass v. Richards, 308 F. 3d 1081, 1 087-88 (1Oth Cir~ 
2002) (finding that a reserve deputy who alleged he was stripped of his reserve conunission 
for supporting the sheriff's opponent in an election was deprived of a benefit "that could 
inhibit speech and thus could infringe on [the employee's] First Amendment rights'~ and ''the 
government infringes upon protected activity whenever it punishes or threatens to punish 
protected speech"). 
55. 518 u.s. 668 (1996). 
56. Id at 673; see also O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712; 
714- I 5 ( 1996) (extending the protection afforded government employees terminated for 
patronage reasons to independent contractors in a companion case). 
57. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 ( 1994)). 
58. See id. 
5'9. See id at 674-76; see also Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723,726-27 (lOth Cir. 
1996) (holding that exercise of free speech does not depend upon receipt of a fuJI-time saJary, 
and thus volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering and 
Connick); Brown v. Disciplinary Comm., 97 F.3d 969, 972-73 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
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Decisions from the United States Supreme Court have not 
deviated from the Rutan-Umbehr principle that infringement of First 
Amendment rights is established when a public employee can show 
that the government conduct chills the exercise of the right~6° Further, 
outside the context of government employment, the need to protect 
citizens from government action that inhibits speech is a well 
established part of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.61 It 
reflects the broader notion that "speech concerning public affairs is 
more than self-expression; it is the ~ssence of self-govermnent.'~2 
Nonetheless, decisions from several appellate courts have begun to 
erroneously borrow the jargon from Title VII case precedent to impose 
a new obstacle on government employees alleging violation of their 
First Amendment rights.63 Rather than demonstrating that the 
retaliatory conduct chills speech, employees in some circuits are 
required to make a. threshold showing that the retaliation caused a 
volunteer frrefighter was protected by the First Amendment because under state law he 
enjoyed some of the benefits of an employee). 
60. SeeUmbehr, 518 U.S. at 674. 
61. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that 
allowing public officials to recover in defamation actions would result in self -censorship by 
those who wish to criticize the operation of the government and that, absent a showing of 
actual malice, the imposition of liability would be inconsistent with the spirit and goals of the 
First Amendment); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (expressing 
concern that ~'the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling 
effect on private speech"). The same concern is reflected in the Court's standing 
jurisprudence, which dictates that a person may challenge a statute on the ground that it 
violates the First Amendment rights of third parties not before the Court, even though the law 
is constitutional as applied to him, based on the fear that an overbroad law will chill protected 
speech. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("Litigants, therefore, are 
permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, 
but because of ajudicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause 
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."). 
This extraordinary departure from the ordinary rules of who may assert Article III jurisdiction 
reflects the special value the Court has placed on First Amendiilent rights. See also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 11.2.2 (discussing the overbreadth doctrine). 
62. Garrison v. Louisiana~ 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); seealsoNouche v. City of Park 
Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[C]riticism of public officials lies at the very core 
of speech protected by the First Anl.endment."). Constitutional theorists have long recognized 
that freedom of speech is crucial in a democracy. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in 
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B~ FoUND. REs. J. 523, 542 (arguing that freedom of 
speech serves an essential "checking value" on government, ensuring against abuse of power 
by government officials); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First An1endment Is an Absolute, 1961 
SUP. ·CT. REY. 245, 255 ("Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the 
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, 
casting. a ballot is assumed to express."). 
63. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir~ 2000) (discussing 
divisions among the circuits). 
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"materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of 
employment.',M 
Ill. TITLE VII's REQUIREMENT OF AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits disparate 
treatment on the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin with 
regard to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.',t)s Title 
VII also bans retaliatory discrimination against those who complain of 
Title VII violations.66 The retaliation provision makes it "an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to discriminate" against 
someone who has opposed an employer's unlawful behavior or 
participated in a Title VII proceeding.6' Despite the broad language in 
the text, the federal appellate courts are divided as to how much harm 
an employee must endure before claims of disparate treatment or 
retaliation are .actionable under Title Vll.68 As to retaliation claims, 
which are most relevant to the First Amendment question, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Ray v. Henderson, 
explained that the circuits have aligned themselves with a broad, 
restrictive, or intermediate position as to what constitutes an adverse 
employment decision actionable under Title Vll.69 The most restrictive 
view, which is followed by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, holds that 
only ''ultimate employment actions" trigger protection under the 
retaliation provision. 70 The Second, 'fhird, and Sixth Circuits have 
adopted an intermediate position, which requires that the employee 
demonstrate a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions 
of employment."71 In contrast, the First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted an expansive view, which 
refuses to categorically limit the types of retaliatory action that can be 
64. See cases cited supra note 13. 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·2(a)(l) (2000). 
66. Id § 2000e-3(a). 
67. Id 
68. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of ''Adverse Employment 
Action" in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: Mat 
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 623,625-31 nn.7-13 (2003). 
69. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-42 (9th Cir. 2000). 
70. Id at 1242 (citations omitted). Under the Hultimate employment decision'' 
standard, a negative employment action is not actionable if the decision is subsequently 
reversed by the employer and the employee is put in the position he would have been in 
absent the negative action. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,576-77 (6th Cir. 2004). 
71. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
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considered an adverse employment action.12 Other courts have 
recognized this same division among the circuits. 73 
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
in its Compliance Manual, has interpreted the retaliation provision of 
Title VII to focus on whether the employer's conduct, even if it falls 
short of a tennination or tangible act, would deter the reasonable 
person from engaging in protected activity.74 Although the EEOC's 
interpretation of Title VIT does not have the force of law, it is 
considered persuasive evidence of congressional intent.75 The Manual 
explains that, unlike the general antidiscrimination provisions in Title 
VII, the retaliation proscription sets no qualifiers on the term "to 
discriminate" and thus should be read to prohibit any discrimination 
"that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity . . . There is no 
requirement that the adverse action materially affect the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment."76 Although some courts have 
adopted the EEOC position, 77 which tracks the First Amendment/ Rutan 
72. /d at 124243. 
73.. Se~ e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep 't of Corr~ Serv., 180 F. 3d 426, 445-46 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (discussing the disagreement among the circuits over how egregious an employer's 
conduct must be to give rise to a retaliation claim under Title VII); see also Joel A. Kravetz, 
Deterrence v. Material Hann: Finding the Appropriate Standard to Define an '~dverse 
Action" in ReWiation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal Employment Opportunity 
Statues, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 321-54 (2002) (providing a circuit-by-circuit analysis 
of retaliation claims brought under Title VII); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis 
Discrimination, 41 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1126 (1998) ("[T]here is a real and growing disarray 
concerning which improperly motivated employment decisions are legally actionable."). 
74. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.003 COMPLIANCE 
MANuAL § 8-11(0)(3) (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.-gov/docs/retal.pdf [hereinafter 
COMPLIANCE MANuAL]. 
75. The EEOC is the administrative enforcement arm ofTitle VII. Indeed, litigants_ 
are required to exhaust administrative remedies before they can pursue claims in state or 
federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000). Although EEOC Guidelines are not binding on 
the courts, they "constitute a body of experience and informedjudgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 
. ' (1986) (quotation omitted). In adopting the expansive interpretation of the retaliation 
provision, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the EEOC's guidance. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 
1242-43. 
76. COMPLIANCE MANuAL, supra note 74~ § .8, at iv. 
77. See·Herrnreiter v: Chicago Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2002), cert 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 472 (2003) (mem.) (noting in dictum that retaliation claims need not 
involve a materially adverse employment action because_ ''it presumably takes rather little to 
deter ... altruistic action" by employees who are making or assisting a complaint on behalf of 
a coworker); Ray; 217 F.3d at 1243 ("This provision does not limit what type of 
discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of severity for actionable 
discrimination."); Glover v. S~C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F. 3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999) 
("Section 704( a)'s protections ensure not only that employers cannot intimidate their 
employees into foregoing the Title VII grievance process, but also that investigators will have 
access to the unchilled testimony of witnesses."); Knox v .. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th 
., 
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approach, others have required that an employee prove the retaliatory 
conduct tangibly or materially affects "terms and conditions of 
employment" in order to be actionable,78 and, as noted, some have 
imposed an even more stringent test, mandating that an employee 
show she was subjected to an "ultimate employment decision."79 
Not surprisingly, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have 
adopted the most stringent test for employees bringing Title VII 
retaliation clain1s, have also most consistently required that 
goverttment employees who seek to bring First Amendment claims 
demonstrate a "materially adverse" or "tangible" job action.80 The 
Fifth Circuit has conceded that the demand for an "adverse 
Cir. 1996) ("There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory act 
that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a 
complaint."). 
78. In White ~Burlington Northem & Santa Fe RmJway Co., the court, in an en bane 
ruling, rejected the EEOC's interpretation (five of the thirteen judges advocated its adoption) 
in favor of a more limited definition of an "adverse employment action" in order "to prevent 
lawsuits based upon trivialities." 364 F.3d 789, 797-800 (6th Cir. 2004). The court 
acknowledged the EEOC's position that its definition excludes "'petty slights and trivial 
annoyances' and anything that is not reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in 
protected activity." Id Nonetheless, it concluded that its more limited definition, which 
requires a materially adverse change in employment conditions, provided guidance to lower 
courts and was preferable to "requiring district courts to detet n1ine on a case-by-case basis 
what actions by an employer are reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in 
protected activity." Id On the other hand, the court rejected the more restrictive "ultimate 
employment decision" standard and held that the employee's suspension without pay and job 
transfer were materially adverse job actions that could be brought under Title VII's retaliation 
provision. Id at 801 ... 04; see also Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617-18 (lith Cir. 
2004) (holding that to be considered an adverse employment action, the plaintiff must show 
either an ultimate employment decision or "meet some threshold level of substantiality''); 
Petersen v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1189 (lOth Cir. 2002) (requiring that the 
retaliation be a "materially adverse" employment action, and finding that neither taking an 
employee "out of the infottnation loop" or unsuccessfully attempting to transfer him met this 
standard); Longstreet v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 276 F. 3d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
an employee's transfer to an allegedly more difficult position and negative perforn1ance 
evaluations were not tangible job consequences and thus could not qualify as adverse 
retaliatory action under Title VII); Weeks v. New York, 273 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that an employee fails to state a claim for retaliation where she does not allege what 
tangible effect her transfer had on the terms and conditions of her employment), abrogated on 
other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 10 I (2002); Hollins v. 
Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (requiring that the plaintiff "identify a 
materially adverse change in the tenns and conditions of his employment to state a claim for 
retaliation under Title VII"); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. ofN. Am., 126 F. 3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 
1997) (requiring that adverse action for retaliation claims affect the terms, conditions, or 
benefits of employment). 
79. Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003), 
cert. demed, 124 S. Ct. 82 (2003) (mem.); Ledergerber v# Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th 
Cir. 1997). 
80. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text 
(discussing the ~'ultimate employment decision" requirement). 
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employment action" for First Amendment litigants is less stringent 
than the ''ultimate decision" test that it has imposed on Title VII 
litigants. 81 In Banks v. East Baton Rouge Pansh School Board, the 
court explained that a retaliatory act under the First Amendment may 
consist of reprimands, disciplinary filings, or a transfer tantan1ount to a 
demotion, even though such conduct would not qualify as an "ultimate 
employment decision'' under Title VII.82 Ultimately, however, the court 
reasoned that neither the alleged "failure to promote and pay 
[plaintiffs] at the appropriate rate" nor the "use of [an] inappropriate 
test to block [employees] rightful positions" would be "an adverse 
employment action" even in the First Amendment context.83 Being 
denied a promotion and salary increase would likely chill the average 
worker from engaging in protected speech, yet the court rejected 
Banks' First Amendment claim that she was retaliated against for 
participating in a lawsuit challenging the allegedly gender-biased 
decision of the School Board to eliminate medical benefits to certain 
employees.84 
Similarly, decisions from the Eighth Circuit have improperly 
relied upon Title VII case precedent in detern1ining that retaliatory 
conduct is not actionable under the First Amendment..85 In Jones v. 
Fitzgerald, the court held that the First Amendment plaintiff failed to 
show that the retaliatory conduct resulted in a '"material employment 
disadvantage' necessary to establish an adverse employment action 
under either Title VII or§ 1983."86 Although Jones was subjected to an 
involuntary transfer, two internal investigations, and negative 
memoranda placed in her personnel file, these did not result in loss of 
"tangible" job benefits, such as salary or job responsibilities.87 Further, 
the investigations led to no "material" disadvantage, even if such were 
motivated by a desire to sanction or harass Jones for her speech.88 
Rather than inquire as to whether such retaliatory action deters speech, 
the court reasoned that in order to prove a constitutional injury, an 
employee must establish "a tangible change in duties or working 
81. See Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir~ 2003). 
82. ld 
83. Id 
84. See id.; see also Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 156-61 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that investigations, public reprimands, a suspension with pay, and a transfer would 
not be actionable under the First Amendment). 
85. See Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705,713-15 (8th Cir. 2002). 
86. Id at 714. 
87. Id 
88. Id at 714-15. 
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conditions that constitute[ s] a material disadvantage."89 Other Eighth 
Circuit cases similarly discuss the need to show significant alteration 
in the conditions of employment or "a material change in the terms 
and conditions of employment" in order to establish a First 
Amendment violation.90 
In addition to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Second and 
Eleventh Circuits have also borrowed Title VII terminology in 
addressing retaliation claims tu1der the First Amendment.91 1rt 
Stavropoulos v. Firestone, the Eleventh Circuit stated that merely 
demonstrating a chilling effect would not support a First Amendment 
claim unless such "resulted from an adverse employment action."92 
Further, the retaliatory action "must involve an important condition of 
employment."93 The plaintiff alleged she suffered emotional distress 
when University of Georgia officials sent her negative memos, 
including a mental illness memo, and encouraged faculty members 
with negative connnents about the plaintiff to come forward.94 Further, 
she incurred costs in seeking to review an allegedly retaliatory decision 
to terminate her employment.95 Nonetheless, the court relied on Title 
VII case precedent, "because the standards are consonant,'' and· 
concluded that the ''harm" was too insubstantial because the decision 
was eventually overridden by other agents of the university.96 
Similarly, in Phillips v. Bowen, the Second Circuit reasoned that a 
89. ld at 713 (quotation omitted). In its analysis, the court suggested that the internal 
investigations were ''warranted" and that there_ was no "fabrication or factual inaccuracies in 
the memoranda pJaced in her personnel file." Jd at 715. This evidence is relevant to the 
question of retaliatory motive, but the court's analysis cuts off this inquiry and denies the 
plaintiff the opportunity to present her case to a jury. ld at 716. 
90. See Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that -"minor 
shifts in employment responsibility did not significantly alter the conditions" of the plaintiff's 
employment); Meyers v. Neb. Health & Hwnan Servs., 324 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the retaliatory employment action must be ~'a material change in the tenns or 
conditions of ... employment" to be actionable); Bechtel v. City of Belton, 250 E3d 1157, 
1162 (8th Cir. 200 I) (holding that "an adverse employment action must effectuate a material 
change in the tem1s or conditions of . . . employment" in order to establish a First 
Amendment violation (quotation omitted)). 
91. See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 619 (11th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. 
Bowen, 278 E3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002). 
92. 361 F.3dat 619. 
93. Id The court explained that its "dual'~ test chilling effect and alteration of an 
important condition of employment was necessary to ensure injury in fact. Jd at 620~ 
Although the Supreme Court has held that subjective chill is insufficient to create standing, 
the Rutan Court defined injury solely in terms of an objective standard, thus obviating this 
purported justiciability question. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 73-76 ( 1990). 
94. Stavropoulos, 361 F.3dat 616-18. 
95. Seeid at 615. 
96. Id at 619~21. 
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combination of minor incidents can form the basis of a constitutional 
retaliation claim if they reach a "critical mass;' but it also stated that a 
First Amendment plaintiff must show that "the total circlJmstances of 
[the] working environment changed to become unreasonably inferior 
and adverse when compared to a typical or normal . . . workplace."97 
The focus of the appellate court on the need for a "critical mass of 
unreasonable inferiority," although understandable to ensure that minor 
incidents of retaliation do not flood the courts, deviates from the core 
question of whether the harassment would chill speech.98 
As previously discussed, many courts, as well as the EEOC, have 
detertnined that interpreting the retaliation clause in Title Vll to require 
materially adverse changes in the terms and conditions of employment 
is not warranted in light of the provision's clear text and congressional 
history.99 It is even more inappropriate to superimpose this restrictive 
interpretation of Title Vll on First Amendment litigants. The Supreme 
Court has not vacillated from the core principle that, absent strong 
countervailing interests, government should not be permitted to deter 
employees from exercising their First Amendment rights.100 In addition 
to case precedent, policy concerns favor a more protective standard 
where First Amendment rights are implicated. Those courts and 
cormnentators who have urged a restrictive interpretation of Title Vll's 
retaliation provision have emphasized their concern that federal courts 
not become embroiled in the everyday decisionmaking process of 
97. 278 F. 3d I 03, 109 (2d Cir. 2002). In instructing the jury, the district court 
acknowledged that "[a] position may become unreasonably inferior if there are repeated and 
severe incidents of harassment that, taken as a whole, would probably deter an average person 
from the exercise of their First Amendment rights." Id 
98. See id. In Deters v. LafUente, another Second Circuit panel similarly borrowed 
Title VII doctrine and used it to deny employees' claims that they were subjected to a hostile 
work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. 368 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d 
Cir. 2004 ). Citing Title VII case precedent, the court found no pattern of constant 
harassment, but it failed to ask whether the action was nonetheless sufficient to deter 
protected speech. Id In the Title VTI context, harassment must be truly egregious in order to 
demonstrate a change in "terms or conditions of employment.'' A similar showing should not 
be imposed on First Amendment litigants. See Levinson, supra note 68, at 623-24. 
99. The EEOC has argued that "[i]n enacting section 2000e-3, Congress 
unmistakably intended to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising his rights 
under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory retaliation." EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 E3d 
541,543 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Levinson, supra note 68, at 651-52 C'Congress intentionally 
refused to adopt a more restrictive retaliation provision, recognizing that employees are 
unlikely to come forward to complain of discrimination against them or another employee if 
they believe such action will be met with retaliation in any fonn."). 
100. See supra Part II. 
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private businesses. 101 But when it is a government employer that is 
retaliating against an employee for challenging the operation of a 
government agency, the federal judiciary has a significant role to play 
in safeguarding the public's right to receive critical information and in 
protecting those who engage in political debate, including goverrunent 
employees who have a unique access to information that is of public 
concern. 102 Once it is recognized that the adverse employment action 
would chill a reasonable employee from engaging in protected speech, 
the severity of' the retaliatory conduct may affect dan1ages, but it 
should not affect liability.103 
IV RETALIATORY ACTION THAT CHILLS SPEECH INFRINGES ON 'I'HE 
FIRST AM:END:MENT RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT Elv1PLOYEES 
In addressing constitutional rights violations, the Supreme Court 
in recent years has moved toward a more nuanced balancing approach 
in lieu ofthe rigid fundamental right/strict scrutiny analysis reflected in 
Warren Court decisions.104 In the context of govermnent employee 
10 l. See Donna Smith Cude & Bryan M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? 
Unlawfill Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It UOlen They 
See It?, 14 LAB. LAW. 373, 407-12 (1998); see also Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 
F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (predicting if Title VII is broadly interpreted to reach any 
adverse employment action, "[t]he Equal Employment Opportunity Cotnmission, already 
staggering under an avalanche of filings too heavy for it to cope with, would be crushed, and 
serious complaints would be lost among the trivial"); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
63 F. 3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he employment-discrimination laws have not vested in 
the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or 
fairness of the business judgments made by employers .... "). 
102. See Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Title VII 
limitations and noting that "[t]here is after all a difference between placing all but the tiniest 
employers in the nation, most of which are private, tmder a comprehensive regime of 
antidiscrimination law, and merely forbidding persons acting under color of state law to 
infringe constitutional rights"). 
103. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (explicating this 
liability/damages distinction in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim). 
104. See Lawrence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The uFrmdamental Right', That Dare 
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1933-45 (2004). There has been significant 
criticism of the Court's use of balancing tests. For example, conservative Justice Antonin 
Scalia has vociferously attacked "ad hoc" balancing and has argued for "bright line" rules to 
reign in the exercise of judicial discretion. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHf. LJ REv. 1175, 1177-81 (1989). Ironically, this same aversion to balancing 
was a distinctive feature of the liberal Warren Court; at that time, the concern was that 
balancing would not be sufficiently protective of free speech interests. See MARTIN H. 
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 226 (1984); see also T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, ConS.titutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-76, 992-94 
( 1987) (arguing that courts lack objective criteria for weighing or comparing competing 
interests and thus subjectivity will determine how the balance will be struck). The liberal 
Justices on the Rehnquist Court are now advocating a "balancing" test to avoid the minimal 
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speech, a balancing test was long ago adopted by the Court. 105 Since 
1968, the Court has recognized that although employees have the right 
to comment on matters of public concern and the public has a 
significant interest in receiving this c_ommunication, courts_ must also 
take into consideration the interests of the state, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the services it performs.106 
The Court has not made it easy for govenmtent employees to 
succeed under the Pickering~ Connick test. Initially government 
employees must demonstrate that their speech addresses a matter of 
public concem.107 Satisfying this criterion means that only speech 
involving public issues, speech that occupies the "highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values;' will be protected. 108 Further, 
even where an employee's speech is deemed to be "of public concern;' 
scrutiny used when the majority fmds no fundamental right or no "infringement" of a 
fundamental right. Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that Texas's same-sex 
sodomy law violates substantive due process because it impermissibly interferes with the 
liberty interest of individuals to enter into personal relationships without being punished as 
criminals. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The Court did not identify a "fundamental" privacy 
interest; rather, it simply concluded that the liberty clause provides substantial protection to 
adult citizens in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. Id 
Rather than apply "strict scrutiny," the majority simply stated that the state's interests were 
insufficient to outweigh the liberty interest in engaging in consensual sexual conduct without 
risking criminal sanctions. ld 
105. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The need to balance 
competing fundamental values and interests is reflected in other First Amendment doctrine. 
For example, ·in the defamation area, the Court recognized the competing First Amendment 
interests and the States' "strong and legitimate . . . interest[ s] in compensating private 
individuals for injury to reputation." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 
(1974). In Bartnicki v. W>pper, Justice Stevens reasoned that ''privacy concerns give way 
when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance." 532 U.S. 514, 
534 (200 1 ). The Court held that although disclosure of information obtained by intercepting 
telephone communications is a significant intrusion on privacy, imposing liability when the 
person publishing the information did not illegally obtain it and where the conversation 
addressed a public issue would violate_ the First Amendment. ld at 535. 
1 06. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. 
107. See Connick v. Myers; 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983). Although the question of 
what speech should be deemed a ·matter of public concern has raised difficult questions, see 
supra notes 29 and 34 and accompanying text, to the extent this Article addresses whistle-
blowing, appellate courts have consistently held that sp-eech that alleges government 
corruption or malfeasance is of public concern. See Spiegla v. Hull, 371 E3d 928, 937 (7th 
Cir. 2004); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 369 F.3d 826, 830-31 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that speech reporting sexual harassment is always a matter of public concern "even when 
made both as a citizen and as an employee"). 
I 08. Connick, 461 U.S .. at 145 (internal quotations and citations omitted). On the 
other hand, the Court also explained that when an employee's speech relates to a matter of 
personal interest rather than a matter of public concern, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a public agency's personnel decisions will not be subject to judicial review. 
/d. at 14 7. Much criticism has been leveled at this requirement as being too vague, 
subjective, and restrictive. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 50-51. 
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the court may detertnine that it is so inherently or actually disruptive of 
.goverrunent's ability to function that it will not be protected.109 
Additionally, the court may find that there is no causal connection 
between the speech and the negative action,110 or that the employer 
would have taken the same action even if the employee had not 
engaged in the protected speech.• t 1 In short, there are numerous 
obstacles in place that discourage employees from bringing 
purportedly "frivolous" suits and that safeguard the government's 
interest in protecting the workplace.112 
Concededly, as with all federally protected rights, there must be 
an ". ··. gement" in order for government wrongdoing to rise to a. 
constitutional level. However, the Supreme Court ruled long ago that 
an · · gement of the First Amendment occurs whenever an 
employer's conduct would deter a reasonable employee from 
.exercising her rights.113 Lower courts have recognized that some 
retaliatory conduct may be so trivial or inconsequential that it cannot 
be said to "chill" speech.114 But this determination should not be based 
109. See supm note 30 and accompanying text; see also Belcher v~ City ofMcAlester, 
324 F.3d 1203, 1208-09 (lOth Cir. 2003) (fmding employer's action had a chilling effect on 
speech, but concluding, under the Pickering balance, that the government's interest 
outweighed the importance ofthe employee's speech). 
110. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see 
cases cited supra note 3 7; cf. Spiegla v. Hull, 3 71 F. 3d 928, 941-92 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(acknowledging that plaintiff must establish a causal link between the contested speech and 
the adverse employment action, but clarifying that the burden is to prove only that protected 
activity was a motivating factor, not but~for causation as recited in earlier cases). An 
employment action may be so trivial that it cannot be said to reflect retaliatory animus. This 
is very different, however, from saying that certain types of retaliatory conduct are not 
actionable, regardless of retaliatory motive, simply because they do not constitute a material 
change in the terms or conditions of employment. 
111. See Spiegla, 3 71 F. 3d at 93 5.; see also Wells, supra note 2, at 971 (citing cases that 
demonstrate employers; ability to come up with· some-evidence of insubordinate behavior or 
other misconduct and to demonstrate that that was a detern1inative cause ofthe dismissal). 
112. See WelJs, supra note 2, at 957-59 ("[T]he general fragility of First Amendment 
rights is exacerbated in this obstacle-laden remedial scheme."). Professor Wells describes the 
restrictions imposed by the Court under the Pickering/ Connick balance~ as well as the 
restrictions imposed in bringing retaliatory suits under § 1983. Id 
113. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990). 
114. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 872-76 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Although the Ninth Circuit has been highly protective of employees'' free speech claims, it 
has made it clear that retaliatory action may be so insignificant that it would not deter the 
.exercise of First Amendment rights. Id In Nunez, the court rejected claims of a plaintiff who 
alleged only that he had been bad-mouthed and verbally threatened by his employer. Jd at 
875; see also Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 E3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (''The essential 
holding of NW1ez is simply that when an employer's response includes only minor acts, such 
as 'bad-mouthing,' that cannot reasonably be expected to deter protected speech, such acts do 
not violate an employee's First Amendment rights."). Other circuits have taken a similar 
approach. See Eaton & Meneley, 379 F.3d 949, 954-56 (lOth Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the 
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on whether an employee can meet some threshold mechanical standard 
of a tangible or substantially adverse harm to employment, which has 
been applied in some circuits to limit protection for government 
employeeS.115 Indeed, the retaliatory action should not have to relate to 
the job at all, but rather impennissibly motivated nonemployment 
conduct, such as bringing false civil or criminal actions against an 
employee for engaging in protected speech, should also be viewed as a 
violation of the First Amendment 116 
The question of what actions by an employer are reasonably 
likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity will 
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, but the definition of a 
"materially adverse'' employment action triggers the same fact 
objective standard of a person of ordinary frrmness is rigorous and ''a trivial or de minimis 
injury will not support a retaliatory prosecution claim" (quotation omitted)); sheriff's conduct 
in running criminal background checks on plaintiffs who attempted to remove him from 
office would not chill the actions of those who enter the arena of political debate); Naucke v. 
City of Park Hills, 284 E3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that even if the harassing 
comments made about the plaintiff were offensive, unprofessional, and inappropriate, the 
embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress the plaintiff allegedly endured would be 
insufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to speak out, and, in fact, 
the record demonstrated that the plaintiff continued to speak on numerous occasions); Suppan 
v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "[i]t would trivialize the First 
Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always 
actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary fmnness from that exercise" 
(quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 E2d 622, -625 (7th Cir. 1982))). Concerns about trivializing the 
First Amendment or unjustified federal intervention into personnel matters should be allayed 
by proper application of this "chilling effect" standard. Superimposing Title VII requirements 
on First Amendment retaliation litigants is unnecessary, as well as inappropriate. 
115. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text. 
116. See Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F. 3d 484, 488-89 (1Oth Cir. 1996) (holding that 
prosecution motivated by a desire to discourage protected speech violates the First 
Amendment); see also Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
adverse action in the First Amendment context is not limited to employment decisions). Note 
that even in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, some courts have-recognized that the 
retaliation provision is broad enough to cover actions that are not employment related. For 
example, the Seventh Circuit has held that "non-employment activities such as brick-
throwing, tire-slashing or other unfortunate acts," which would not have occurred but for the 
employee's exercise of protected rights may be brought under Title VII. See Schobert v. Ill. 
Dep't ofTransp., 304 F.3d 725, 733-34 (7th Cir., 2002); see also Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 
241 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir~ 2001) (acknowledging that the filing of false_ police reports would 
violate the retaliation provision); Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F. 3d 881, 892 (7th Cir. 
1996) (finding that retaliatory motivated threats of violence and tort civil actions could be 
brought under Title VII); Berry v. Stevenson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (lOth Cir.- 1996) 
(holding that a malicious prosecution action brought against a former employee constitutes an 
adverse employment action for purposes of retaliation claim); cf. Chock v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the employer's alleged 
obstruction of an employee's studies for an M.B.A .. and his attempt to prevent the employee 
from living with his direct supervisor were not adverse employment actions because neither 
involved benefits of his employment). 
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intensive consideration. 117 Further, lower courts have at their disposal 
some forty years of case precedent defining when govenrment action 
chills speech. 118 Obviously, the magnitude of the hartn is a key 
criterion in detertnining whether a reasonable employee would be 
deterred from engaging in First Amendment activity. However, 
superimposing Title VII requirements on First Amendment litigants 
simply means that some retaliation claims will be rejected even though 
the conduct in question would chill the exercise of protected speech, 
contrary to the purposes and goals of that Amendment. 
Once a court has determined that the government employer 
intended to punish speech (retaliatory motive) and that he has 
subjected the employee to adverse action that chills speech (an 
· · gement), the question of how severely an employer has harmed 
the employee should play no role in the Pickering- Connickbalance.119 
Allowing employees to be subjected to harassing, retaliatory conduct, 
just because such conduct does not "substantially change the terms and 
conditions of their employment," will not promote the efficiency of 
government. To the contrary, it sends a dangerous message to 
employers that they can penalize and thus deter speech with 
impunity a message that clearly affects employee morale and cuts off 
debate that could improve the efficacy of government. Further, the 
fact that the retaliatory conduct falls short of a dismissal or other 
"tangible" action does not negate the finding of an infringement-
117. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(recognizing that the existence of a materially adverse employment action cannot be defined 
by any "list" because courts must consider "indices that might be unique to a particular 
situation"). Even if Title VII's more stringent test might add some clarity, this is an 
insufficient justification for restricting First Amendment rights. 
118. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,73 (1990); see a/so cases cited supra 
note 114. 
119. However, in Gross v. Norton, the court reasoned that a less serious adverse 
employment action may decrease the burden on the government employer to justify its action. 
120 F. 3d 877, 879 (8th Cir. 1997). In this case, the retaliatory conduct consisted of the city 
merely delaying the plaintiff's testimony before the Minnesota legislature by a few days, and 
thus the court reasoned that a First Amendment violation had not occurred. ld It may be that 
this action would not chill the reasonable employee from engaging in speech, but this author 
contends that this is an inquiry that should not affect other aspects of First Amendment 
analysis, including shifting burdens of proof. If a constitutional infringement has occurred, 
the magnitude of that infringement should not affect the balance. This should be contrasted 
to the Court's approach in Connick, which suggested that the importance of the speech would 
detennine whether government must show disruptive potential or actual disruption of the 
workplace in order to justify infringing on speech. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 
(1983). Because the importance of the speech and the public's need to receive this 
communication is one of the two aspects of the Pickenng balance, making this a criterion 
which affects the government's burden has some justification. 
698 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:669 
courts should not recognize a "de minimis" exception where critical 
First Amendment rights are at stake.120 Rather, the extent of the injury 
should be addressed only with regard to damages. 121 
Two examples using this approach and expressly rejecting Title 
VII standards are noteworthy. In Coszalter v. City of Salem, the Ninth 
Circuit held that, for First Amendment retaliation claims, the adverse 
employment action "need not be severe and it need not be of a certain 
kind."122 The court recognized that although retaliatory action may be 
so insi · icant that it does not deter the exercise of F:.tst Amendment 
rights, the court rejected the use of any "exclusive, category-based 
limitation on the kind of retaliatory action that is actionable under the 
First Amendment."123 The court reasoned that a disciplinary investi-
gation, a transfer to new duties, a criminal investigation, repeated and 
ongoing verbal harassment and humiliation, an unpleasant work 
assigtnnent, and withholding of customary public recognition would 
be, either individually and certainly cumulatively, sufficient to sustain 
a First Amendment retaliation claim.124 It sufficed that the defendant's 
120. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2323 (2004) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("There are no de minimis violations of the Constitution no 
constitutional harms so slight that the courts are obliged to ignore them."); cf Eaton v. 
Meneley, 379 F.3d 949, 955 (lOth Cir. 2004) (quoting Tenth Circuit precedent that "de 
minimis injury will not support a retaliatory prosecution"); White v. Burlington N. & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004) (en bane) ("Employment actions that are de 
minimis are not actionable under Title Vll."). 
121. See Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1996) (fmding that an 
employee who alleges that her reputation, opportunities for advancement, and earning 
potential were impaired by her employer's acts may proceed with her First Amendment claim; 
further, allegation that the employee endured a campaign of harassment that "caused her great 
worry and unhappiness," constituted compensable injury, even if such did not include 
monetary losses because emotional distress is a legally recognized and compensable harm; 
fmally, even where a litigant does not prove actual compensable injury, she may be entitled to 
an award of nominal damages if she proves violation of a substantive constitutional right); see 
also Wells, supra note 2, at 1015-18 (arguing that § 1983 damage rules are too restrictive, in 
particular with regard to retaliation claims, in that the law provides no vehicle for recognizing 
the harm done to the public interest when government employee speech is punished). 
Although the Supreme Court in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 471 U.S. 
299, 307 ( 1986), recognized that harm in First Amendment retaliation cases may include 
injuries such as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and 
suffering, Professor Wells contends that this ignores the intrinsic actual losses that occur 
whenever free speech rights are violated. Wells, supra note 2, at 1018. He suggests an award 
of presumed or pwtitive damages when compensatory damages fail to "capture the full cost 
of the harm done by a constitutional violation." ld at 1019. 
122. 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003). 
123. ld 
124. Jd at 976-77. 
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action was "reasonably likely to deter'' employees from engaging in 
protected activity. 125 
Similarly, in Power v. Summers, the Seventh Circuit specifically 
contrasted federal employment discrimination statutes, which limit 
protection to victims of materially adverse employment action, from 
constitutional claims where any deprivation that is likely to deter the 
exercise of free speech should be actionable. 126 The court noted that 
under the First Amendment adverse action is not limited to 
employment, but rather includes any retaliatory conduct that 
effectively deters ''exercise of a fragile liberty."127 Thus, the district 
court erred in denying retaliation claims brought by university 
professors based on its finding that raises were discretionary and thus 
their reduction was not an adverse employment action. Even though 
the reduction involved hundreds, not thousands, of dollars, the critical 
question was whether the reduction was in retaliation for the fact that 
the professors had been ''outspoken" on issues of faculty salaries, and 
whether such reduction was sufficient to deter the exercise of free 
speech~ 128 The court recognized that '"a campaign of petty harassment' 
and 'even minor forms of retaliation,' 'diminished responsibility, or 
false accusations' can be actionable under the First Amendment."129 
V CONCLUSION 
Retaliatory action, including threats, the reduction of 
discretionary raises, involuntary transfers, negative memoranda placed 
in a personnel file, internal investigations; public reprimands, 
suspension with pay, or nonemployment related forms of harassment 
may chill the ordinary person from engaging in speech, even if such 
would not be considered a material or tangible change in the tem1s and 
conditions of employment.. Yet, employees facing these types of 
retaliatory action have had their First Amendment claims dismissed in 
some circuits simply because they failed to meet the heightened injury 
standard imposed on Title VII litigants. This Article contends that 
125. ld at 976. 
126. 226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362 
F.3d 87, 94 (lst Cir. 2004) ("[T]he standard for showing an adverse employment action is 
. . . 
lower in the First Amendment retaliation context than it is in other contexts (such as Title Vll) 
... and the Supreme Court has indicated that even relatively minor events might give rise to 
liability."). 
127. Power, 226 E3d at 820. 
128. ld at 820-21. 
129. Id at 821 (citing DeGUiseppe v. Vill. of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir. 
1995)) (quotations omitted). 
700 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:669 
whenever the retaliatory action meets the threshold "chilling" or 
deterrence level, a court should address the magnitude of the injury 
caused by the retaliatory conduct only at the damages phase. Those 
circuits that have deviated from this standard have ignored clear 
Supreme Court precedent and have violated core First Amendment 
principles. It is critical that the Supreme Court step in to reaffirm the 
Rutan standard so that government employees will continue to freely 
contribute to the public debate on speech that lies at the core of the 
First Amendment speech that is necessary to democratic self-
government 
